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who shared some but certainly not all the concerns 
of GMO exporters, such as Brazil and Mexico. In 
one striking example, the European Union, a major 
supporter of more stringent regulation, pushed for 
greater documentation requirements for the trans-
genic commodity trade. This was supported by most 
developing countries and hence by most current par-
ties to the protocol. If accepted, the proposal would 
have substantially altered the conditions for the 
commodity grain trade. However, the proposal was 
watered down and prevented from becoming bind-
ing law only because of initial opposition from Bra-
zil and finally by a dramatic last minute interven-
tion by Mexico (presumably under pressure from its 
NAFTA trading partners). The geo-political impli-
cations for Brazil and Mexico in assuming such an 
oppositional role are important to consider.
This negotiating dynamic also made clear the dilem-
ma facing GMO-exporting countries: should they 
ratify the protocol in order to participate more fully 
in treaty evolution in the future? To do so would, 
however, require immediate compliance with its ob-
ligations and could also mean being at a competitive 
disadvantage with agricultural exporting competi-
Biotechnology remains one of the most con-tentious governance challenges on the mul-tilateral negotiating agenda. This makes de-
velopments within the newest global regime in this 
area – the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, regulat-
ing trade in genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
– especially important for scholars of regime effec-
tiveness and institutional interplay. Since its adop-
tion in January 2000, the protocol has been the sub-
ject of sustained analysis. Despite this, it remains 
unclear how this global regime will affect nation-
al-level governance of biosafety and how its rela-
tionship to the world trade regime will evolve. This 
is partly because treaty implementation is only just 
beginning, and partly because of its contentious na-
ture, which results in unusual negotiating dynamics 
as was evident at the recent meeting of the parties to 
the protocol in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in February 
2004. This commentary takes stock of this evolving 
regime and points to a number of issues that merit 
further scholarly attention.
Negotiating Dynamics and Treaty Evolution
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Kuala Lum-
pur meeting was that potential GMO importers (and 
particularly the European Union) were in the driving 
seat of treaty evolution during this session. Parties 
to the protocol do not yet include any major agri-
cultural exporter (no member of the so-called Mi-
ami Group of GMO producers, including the United 
States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, Uruguay, and 
Chile, has ratified the protocol).  In Kuala Lumpur, 
these countries therefore did not have equal voice in 
treaty evolution, as they had during creation of the 
regime. This is a key element to consider in analyses 
of regime effectiveness and institutional interplay in 
this case. 
Some consequences were evident in shifting alli-
ances at the meeting. With no major GMO exporter 
a party to the protocol, the task of opposing propos-
als for stringent biosafety rules fell to those parties 
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transnational transfers of GMOs. Will it stymie 
such transfers or instead facilitate transnational 
flows of biotech products? This depends, in turn, 
on the kinds of domestic biosafety frameworks 
that are being put into place to implement the 
protocol. This process is now well underway and 
seemingly uncontroversial. The capacity building 
initiatives promoted by the protocol to develop 
domestic biosafety frameworks are intended to be 
country-driven processes of adopting and adapting 
models from elsewhere. But the question remains: 
will the protocol serve to spread similar biosafety 
frameworks across the globe and hence make trade 
in GMOs easier (as exporters would desire) or will 
diverse country-specific frameworks emerge that 
augment national autonomy and importer choice? 
The jury is still out.
Global - National Interactions 
To analyze this question, empirical understanding 
of whether and how global regimes are influencing 
national-level institutional and political change – 
i.e. a focus on global-national institutional linkag-
es – is urgently needed. With support from a Ma-
carthur Foundation Research and Writing Grant, a 
collaborative project is currently underway, which 
is analyzing the influence of the evolving glob-
al governance architecture for biotechnology in 
Mexico, China, South Africa, and India. The aim 
is to understand, also through using a comparative 
lens across these countries, the extent to which 
policy-making within the developing world about 
appropriate use of a powerful new technology is 
facilitated or constrained by different components 
of a global governance architecture.
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tors who decide to remain outside the regime (the 
US, for example, cannot become a party to the 
protocol because it has not yet ratified the parent 
Convention on Biological Diversity). 
Inter-Regime Conflicts: How Real a Concern?
This dilemma about whether to join the biosafety 
regime is also related to the long-standing con-
cern among GMO exporters that the protocol 
may conflict with world trade rules. This has 
been the subject of much scholarly attention yet 
the issue remains in flux. Importantly, however, 
the protocol’s approach is similar to the WTO in 
its privileging of science-based national choices 
about GMO imports, which are to be directly 
related to ecological and human health impacts. 
This largely excludes social and food security 
dimensions of biotechnology trade, such as pos-
sible disruption of non-GM commodity exports if 
adequate segregation or traceability systems are 
not in place. Such factors might legitimately give 
pause to developing countries in permitting GM 
imports, yet these factors have no place in the 
current global governance architecture. This sug-
gests that the consequences of inter-regime simi-
larities (rather than only conflicts) merit some at-
tention as well.
A certain ambiguity about how much policy 
autonomy the protocol will allow developing 
countries may also shed light on the nature of 
the compliance debates in Kuala Lumpur. Intui-
tively, it could be assumed that supporters of a 
regime would also desire strong compliance with 
it. Yet in Kuala Lumpur, most developing coun-
tries argued for weak and non-punitive compli-
ance mechanisms, despite having pushed for the 
protocol. This can be partly explained by devel-
oping country concerns about their own potential 
(capacity-related) non-compliance. It may also, 
however, point to continuing lack of clarity about 
who will benefit from the protocol and hence 
from compliance with it.
This turns on how the protocol will impact on 
